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Introduction
Shortly after deregulation, many airlines replaced their point-to-point networks with huband-spoke systems. There is now considerable evidence documenting that hub-and-spoke networks provide airlines with cost and scheduling advantages. 1 However, there is also evidence indicating that hub-and-spoke systems provide airlines with market power at their hub airports. Studies have shown that airlines receive higher fares on hub routes than they do on comparable routes elsewhere in their network. In addition, studies have found that -on routes that depart from an airline's hub -the hub carrier receives higher fares than its competitors. 2 While the existence of a "hub premium" (measured in either of these two ways) has now been clearly established, evidence on the cause of the "hub premium" is in shorter supply. Such evidence is important, however, because the relationship between airport dominance and route market power may reflect several factors. As Borenstein (1991) explains, one can distinguish between the "natural advantages" that accrue to dominant airlines and those that result from institutions created by the airlines. For example, the former include the reputation that a dominant airline acquires as a result of offering the largest number of flights in and out of a particular city while the latter include marketing programs such as frequent-flyer programs (FFPs) . By rewarding consumers in a non-linear way, FFPs create an incentive for consumers to concentrate their purchases with a single carrier. When selecting the airline with which to accumulate points, consumers will prefer the dominant carrier at an airport because it offers the best opportunities for earning points and redeeming rewards. Finally, dominant airlines may also be able to influence the allocation of scarce airport facilities such as gates. Understanding the relative importance of these factors is critical to designing policy that seeks to increase competition at hubs. 3 For example, if the primary advantage of airport dominance is the ability to offer a more attractive FFP, then encouraging small-scale entry into hub airports by improving access to airport facilities would do little towards increasing competition since these carriers would still be unable to match the dominant airline's FFP. On the other hand, banning
FFPs might both encourage entry into dominated airports and allow small-scale entrants to better compete with the dominant carrier.
In this paper, I investigate whether the fare premium that hub carriers receive results from the fact that they have an advantage in the use of FFPs. I develop a novel empirical approach to estimating the fare premium that is associated with a hub carrier's FFP. The approach exploits three FFP partnerships formed in the late 1990s. 4 American Airlines and US Airways, Delta Air
Lines and United Airlines, and Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines each formed a partnership which allowed members of one airline's FFP to earn and/or redeem that airline's frequent flyer points when traveling on flights operated by its partner. 5 These partnerships can be used to estimate the relationship between FFPs and hub airlines' fares because they effectively extend a hub airline's FFP to include a set of flights which was not previously included in the program. If FFPs allow a dominant airline to charge higher fares on routes that depart from its hubs, then these partnerships should allow a dominant airline's partner to charge higher fares on routes that depart from these same airports. Because partners' flights should not be affected by any of the dominant airline's other sources of advantage, any estimated change in fares on a partner's flights should capture only the premium that is associated with offering the dominant carrier's FFP points.
Consider, for example, the partnership between Delta and United. This partnership may affect Delta in two ways. First, consumers who collect Delta's FFP points may perceive the partnership with United to be an enhancement to Delta's FFP and may therefore perceive Delta's FFP points to be more valuable than they were before. All else equal, this may increase Delta's demand and fares from these consumers. Second, consumers who collect United's FFP points may find Delta's flights to be more attractive because they can now earn United FFP points on these flights. All else equal, this may increase Delta's demand and fares from these consumers.
While these two effects will operate simultaneously, note that they will, in general, operate at two different types of airports. To the extent that consumers who collect Delta's points are those who regularly fly out of airports at which Delta is dominant (for example, Atlanta), the first effect is likely to occur on Delta's routes that depart from airports at which it is dominant. That is, this effect will enhance Delta's existing advantage at airports at which it is dominant. On the other hand, to the extent that consumers who collect United's FFP points are those that regularly fly out of airports at which United is dominant (for example, Denver), the second effect is likely to occur on Delta's routes that depart from airports at which United is dominant. That is, this effect will extend United's advantage at these airports to Delta's flights. It is this second effect which can provide an estimate of the relationship between FFPs and fares at dominated airports.
Specifically, the increase in fares that Delta experiences on its routes that depart from United's hubs -once United's FFP points can be earned on its flights -provides a lower bound estimate of the fare premium that United experiences on its hub routes as a result of offering the most attractive FFP.
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, using data from the pre-partnership period, I obtain estimates of the "hub premium" which I measure as the fare premium that a hub carrier receives relative to its competitors on a given route. Then, to determine how much of this premium results from the fact that the hub carrier offers the most attractive FFP, I
investigate what happens when the hub carrier's FFP points can suddenly be earned on its partner's flights. Specifically, I estimate how the extension of a hub carrier's FFP to include its partner's flights increases the fares that the partner receives. I combine the results from these two empirical exercises to obtain an estimate of the fraction of the "hub premium" that is due to
FFPs. As a check that I am indeed capturing a "FFP effect", I also investigate whether the partnerships had a larger impact on fares at the top of the price distribution than at the bottom.
Because FFPs offer a kickback to business travelers, the effects should be greatest for tickets that are more likely to have been purchased by business travelers.
The paper's main set of results establishes that offering the FFP points of the dominant carrier at an airport confers a pricing premium. After the partnerships were in place, airlines received higher fares on routes that departed from specifically those airports at which their partner was dominant. This provides direct evidence that FFPs are at least one of the reasons why dominant carriers receive higher fares than their competitors. The estimates imply that allowing consumers to earn the dominant carrier's FFP points on its flights increased the mean fare that an airline received by between 3.7% and 5% and the 80 th percentile fare that an airline received by between 7% and 9%. Combining these estimates with estimates of the "hub premium" that are in the range of 14% suggests that FFPs account for between 25% and 37% of the fare premium that hub carriers receive.
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This paper contributes to the growing literature on the "hub premium". This literature has established that airlines receive higher fares on their hub routes than on their non-hub routes, as well as receive higher fares than their competitors on routes that depart from their hubs.
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Some papers also provide suggestive evidence that this premium is at least partly due to FFPs.
In early papers, Borenstein (1989) Evans and Kessides (1993) show that increases in an airline's share of passengers at the endpoint airports of a route allow it to charge higher fares on that route. Evans and Kessides (1993) also show that airport capacity constraints and ownership of CRSs augment an airline's local market power, but do not fully explain it, suggesting that the cause must lie elsewhere. Using a structural model of supply and demand, Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006) find that hub airlines are able to charge higher fares on routes that depart from their hubs; however this pricing advantage is limited to tickets that appeal to price-inelastic consumers. Their finding that the hub advantage is limited to "business travelers" suggests that
FFPs are at least part of the story. 8 In a more recent paper, Lee and Prado (2005) estimate the relationship between hubs and fares, explicitly controlling for an airline's mix of tourist and business passengers. Without controlling for passenger mix (but controlling for market fixed effects), they find that hub carriers receive fares that are about 16% higher than their competitors. Once they also control for passenger mix, the find that hub carriers no longer receive a premium on leisure tickets, but a substantial premium (about 15%) remains for premium tickets. 9 This paper illustrates that the "hub premium" results from the fact that hub carriers are both able to charge higher fares for tickets that are identical on observable characteristics and attract a disproportionate share of passengers who purchase premium tickets.
Finally, Ciliberto and Williams (2007) investigate the role of access to airport facilities in determining the hub premium. The find that including variables which measure airlines' access to airport facilities eliminates differences in an airline's fares across its hub and non-hub routes.
However, they do not address differences in the fares of hub and non-hub carriers serving a given route.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the economics of FFPs. In Section III, I discuss the three FFP partnerships studied. Section IV describes the data and variables. Section V presents the empirical approach. In Section VI, I present and discuss the results. A final section concludes.
The Economics of FFPs
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FFPs award consumers points for purchased flights. The number of points awarded is typically equal to the distance of the flight but may also depend on the type of ticket purchased.
Accumulated FFP points can be redeemed for rewards, the most common of which are free tickets or class upgrades. FFP reward schedules are structured such that a minimum number of points must be earned before any reward can be redeemed, after which the value of rewards generally increases non-linearly with the number of points required. 11 In addition, FFPs have "elite programs" that award "status" to consumers who fly a minimum number of miles with the airline in a year. Most have three tiers, with qualification for each tier requiring an increasing number of miles flown. Each tier entitles a traveler to an increasing amount of preferential treatment. Because the elite programs entitle a consumer to preferential treatment on all flights taken with the airline in the year of qualification, they create large, discrete increases in the value of earning additional FFP points as one nears the thresholds. These non-linearities give consumers an incentive to accumulate all of their points in a single airline's FFP. This is the sense in which these programs "create loyalty".
If consumers regularly fly to multiple destinations or are uncertain about where they will need to fly, then they will prefer the FFP of the airline that serves the largest set of routes out of their home airport. In addition to maximizing opportunities for earning points, this airline will also offer the largest selection of reward destinations. For these reasons, the dominant airline at an airport will offer the most attractive FFP, for consumers at that airport. Once consumers become invested in that airline's FFP, any flight not taken with that airline represents forgone FFP points. To induce consumers to purchase their flights, carriers that are not dominant at the airport (who cannot offer as attractive a FFP) must offer a lower price. By forcing competitors to offer this "extra" price reduction, the use of a FFP by the dominant airline at an airport can lower the profits of airlines which serve only a small set of routes out of that airport. 12 Note that the price reduction that competitors must offer is not simply offset by the revenue that the dominant carrier forgoes when consumers claim FFP rewards since airlines carefully restrict reward availability to minimize the extent to which rewards displace otherwise paid-for tickets. If so, then FFPs provide dominant airlines with a "cheap" way to give consumers utility that is not available to airlines that have only a small presence at the airport.
In this way, a dominant airline's FFP may deter entry by carriers that wish to serve only a small set of routes out of an airport or, if they do enter, make it difficult for them to attract consumers, in particular the lucrative ones (such as business travelers) who place a high value on FFP points and a low value on price. Indeed, one of the reasons why FFPs may be so effective is because they exploit a principal-agent problem between business travelers (who book their own travel and keep the associated FFP points) and their employers (who pay for this travel). The result is that, on many routes out of an airline's hubs, the hub carrier faces little competition and, on routes where competition does exist, the dominant carrier may be able to both charge higher prices and capture a greater share of passengers. That is, FFPs may both limit entry into airports that are dominated by a single carrier and provide that carrier with a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the competitors that it does face.
Cleary, one effect of FFPs may be to limit entry on routes that depart from dominated airports. This may both prevent a lower cost firm from serving the market as well as lead to higher prices and a fewer tickets sold by the higher cost incumbent. However, in addition to their impact on competition and prices, FFPs may affect welfare in two other ways. First, as mentioned above, FFPs may distort the purchasing behavior of business travelers whose tickets are paid for by their employer. This, in turn, may distort airlines' allocation of high-and lowpriced seats. Second, by allowing airlines to bundle reward flights with paid-for flights, FFPs may be used as a form of price discrimination. If the products used as rewards would not otherwise be sold and if consumers' valuation of these products is greater than their cost to the airline, then this price discrimination may be welfare-enhancing. Of course, the principal-agent problem may cause business travelers' valuation of the reward flights to be greater than their true reservation value for these units. For the bundling aspect of these programs to increase overall welfare (and not just consumer surplus), travelers' true reservation values for the units must be greater than their opportunity cost.
The Domestic FFP Partnerships
Facts
In January 1998, Continental and Northwest announced a "strategic global alliance" which included FFP reciprocity, shared lounges, codesharing and an equity purchase by Northwest in Continental. 13 On December 6, 1998, reciprocal earning took effect. Miles earned on either carrier would count towards elite status in either one of the programs. equal -these two airlines should experience similar demand. While both airlines should still be able be able to price at a premium relative to other competitors on the route, the dominant carrier should have no particular advantage over its partner (controlling for other differences between them). Moreover, because the dominant airline's FFP points are now available on two different airlines' flights, competition between them should lower the price premium that the dominant airline's FFP affords, relative to the premium that the dominant airline could charge when it alone offered flights on which its FFP points can be earned. Note that, in general, all routes that an airline serves out of its partner's hubs will also be served by the dominant airline itself. This implies that any estimated increase in an airline's fares on routes that depart from its partner's hubs represents the price premium that association with the dominant airline's FFP affords, conditional on there being another airline (the dominant airline itself) on which these points can be earned. This premium should be lower than the premium that the dominant airline can charge when it is effectively a "monopolist" on its FFP points. For this reason and because points earned on partners often do not confer the exact privileges as points earned on the airline itself (for example, Delta points earned on United flights do not count towards elite status in Delta's FFP while Delta points earned on Delta flights do), the estimates of the change in an airline's fares on routes that depart from its partner's must be considered a lower bound on the price premium that FFPs afford dominant airlines.
So Why "Partner with the Competition"?
The discussion above begs the question of why the domestic partnerships were formed in the first place. While not the focus of this paper, it is worthwhile to briefly comment on this
issue. There are a number of possible reasons why these airlines partnered in 1998. 15 First, the partnership "wave" was begun by Continental and Northwest who -both significantly smaller than the other big domestic carriers -likely saw an extensive alliance as a way to increase their ability to compete against the larger domestic carriers. Estimates in a Government Accounting
Office report (1999) show that the domestic market shares of Continental and Northwest in 1997 were 6.2% and 8.5% respectively. These are substantially below the market shares of the other four major domestic carriers which ranged from 10.4% for US Airways to 17.6% for Delta. The alliances announced by American and US Airways and Delta and United might simply have been competitive responses to the Continental-Northwest alliance.
Second, because of regional differences in the airlines' networks, these partnerships could, in fact, lead to a reasonable amount of network expansion, both from a FFP and codesharing perspective. Each partnership combined carriers with different regional focuses.
Delta has an extensive network in the East, Southeast and Southwest while United has an extensive network in the West and Midwest. Continental's principal service areas are the Table 1 shows the amount of overlap in the domestic networks of each set of partners. It also shows the amount of overlap for each other possible pairing that could have been formed.
The table illustrates that there is, in fact, only a small number of routes on which both partners provide direct service. In addition, the airlines appear to have partnered with the carrier whose network was the least or one of the least overlapping with their own, suggesting that the airlines did view these partnerships as being somewhat about expanding their networks or improving their competitive positions at airports or in regions in which they were weak.
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[ Table 1 about here]
Data and Descriptive Analysis
Sources of Data and Construction of Sample
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The primary source of data is Databank 1A (DB1A) of the Department of Transportation's Origin and Destination Survey (O&D). This database is a random 10% sample of all domestic tickets that originate in the U.S each quarter. The DOT data is supplemented with airline schedule data from the Official Airlines Guide (OAG). The analysis is restricted to direct coach-class round-trip tickets on the six airlines that formed the FFP partnerships. The sample is restricted to direct flights for two reasons. First, to the extent that consumers' valuation of direct service is positively correlated with their valuation of FFP points, then it is an airline's direct flights that should experience the greatest increase in demand after the formation of a FFP partnership. Second, by restricting to direct flights, I ensure that the "treatment routes" (e.g.: Delta's routes that depart from airports at which its partner United is dominant) and the two sets of "control routes" (e.g.: Delta's routes out of non-partners' hubs and other airlines' routes out United's hubs) are more likely to be similar to each other unobservable dimensions.
The sample includes all routes between the top 35 U.S airports, based on year 2000
enplanements. 19 This produces a sample of 877 distinct origin and destination pairs that had direct service by at least one of the six airlines included in my sample. On average, there are 1.4
carriers providing direct service on each route-quarter in my sample with 37% of the routes having direct service by two or more such carriers. The final dataset has 23,282 observations (airline-route-quarters).
Variables and Summary Statistics 20
For each airline-route-quarter, I use the DOT data to calculate the passenger-weighted Hubsize2 respectively equal one if an airline has less than 40% of departing domestic flights from an airport, between 40% and 58% of departing domestic flights from an airport, and greater than 58% of departing flights. 22, 23 Most airlines' hubs fall into this top dominance category.
Partner Hubsize0 through Partner Hubsize2 are similarly constructed based on an airline's partner's share of flights at an airport.
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All of the Hubsize variables are interacted with Partnership Period which is a dummy variable that equals one in quarters in which an airline's FFP partnership is in place.
[ Table 2 about here]
It is worth emphasizing that while the sample itself is large, the number of observations used to identify the coefficients of interest is much smaller. Airlines, in general, do not operate very many direct flights out of another airline's hubs. In most cases, an airline will provide direct service to its own hubs and perhaps one or two large non-hub airports from an airport that is a hub to a competitor. In my sample, there are approximately 60 direct flights each quarter that are operated by an airline out of airports at which its partner has more than 40% of departing flights. This gives a total of 223 direct flights departing from airports in Partner Hubsize1 in the post-partnership quarters and 395 direct flights departing from airports in Partner Hubsize2 in the post partnership quarters. It is these two sets of flights which identify the coefficients on the Partner Hubsize variables.
Descriptive Analysis
Tables 3 compares airlines' fares before and after the partnerships on three types of routes -those that depart from airports at which their partners have more than 58% of departing flights, those that depart from airports at which other carriers have more than 58% of departing flights, and those that depart from airports at which they have more than 58% of departing flights. The top panel of Table 3 suggests that, after the partnerships were formed, airlines' mean fares on direct flights departing from their partners' most dominated airports increased by about $10 (or 5%). On the other hand, their fares on routes that depart from non-partners' most dominated airports decreased by almost $10. This suggests that inclusion in their partner's FFP did allow airlines to receive higher fares on routes that departed from their partner's hubs, both in absolute terms and relative to what they would have received. Airlines' fares on routes that depart from their own dominated airports are virtually unchanged. Airlines' 80 th percentile fares on direct flights that depart from their partners' dominated airports increased by $22 after the partnerships went into effect. This is in contrast to the almost $20 reduction in the 80 th percentile fares they received on direct flights that depart from airports at which a non-partner was dominant. Interestingly , Table 3 also suggests that, prior to the partnerships, airlines received lower fares on routes that depart from their (future) partner's dominated airports than on routes that depart from other competitors' dominated airports. This may indicate that the airlines were intentionally partnering with carriers who served airports or regions where the airlines themselves were weak.
[ Table 3 about here]
Empirical Specification and Identification
The Hub Effect
In the first part of the empirical analysis, I obtain estimates of the "hub premium". As mentioned above, different authors have estimating hub effects in different ways. Here, I use data from the pre-partnership period (1996 to the second quarter of 1998) to estimate reduced form fare regressions that include route-quarter fixed effects. Thus, the hub effect that I estimate measures average fare differences between hub and non-hub carriers serving a route. I control for other differences between the carriers by including airline-quarter fixed effects (for example, to capture cost and quality differences) and by controlling explicitly for the carrier's frequency on the route and whether or not the route arrives at one of its hubs. α is a route-quarter fixed effect, is an airline-quarter fixed effects and is an error term. It is worth highlighting that with the inclusion of route-quarter fixed effects, the hub effect that I estimate is only identified off of routes that are served by more than one carrier. In my sample of direct flights, 37% of the routes are served by more than one carrier. To check that my estimates are not capturing something specific to those routes that have direct service by more than one airline, I also expand the sample to include connecting flights and estimate the hub premium using both direct and connecting flights. The addition of connecting service allows me to include route-quarter fixed effects and still estimate the hub variables off of a large set of routes. investigate what happens to fares when partnerships allow a hub carrier's FFP points to be earned on flights operated by the hub carrier's partner. Intuitively, I treat the partnerships as an "experiment" in which a hub airline's FFP is suddenly extended to include a set of flights which was not previously included in the program. If FFPs are one of the reasons why hub airlines receive higher fares than their competitors, then this set of flights should experience a fare increase once the partnerships go into effect. Moreover, the change in fares that these flights experience provides a lower bound estimate of the fare premium that FFPs afford a dominant carrier.
As above, I estimate reduced-form price equations. The effects of extending a dominant airline's FFP are estimated as the change in an airline's fares on routes that depart from airports at which its partner is dominant, after its FFP partnership is in place. This change is compared to any change in fares experienced by two alternate sets of "control routes". The first set of "control routes" is an airline's own flights out of airports at which neither it nor its partner is dominant. I estimate the effects of the partnerships relative to this set of "control routes" by including airline-quarter fixed effects in the model. The second set of "control routes" is nonpartners' flights out of a particular airport. I implement this by including origin-quarter fixed effects. I control for underlying differences in fares across routes in a very flexible way by including airline-route fixed effects.
Specifically, I estimate the following equation: The key identifying assumption of the model is that there are no unobserved factors thatover this period -differentially affect an airline's fares on flights that depart from its partner's dominated airports, relative to its fares on flights in these two sets of "control routes". 25 Note that there may be unobservable factors that cause the level of an airline's fares on routes that depart from its partner's hubs to differ from fares on the control routes. These level differences, however, will be captured by the airline-route fixed effects. The identification strategy only requires that, over the period in which the partnerships are formed, there are no unobservable factors that would cause the time trends to differ. Table 4 presents estimates of the "hub premium" in the pre-partnership sample, using
Empirical Results
The Hub Effect
Mean Fare as the dependent variable.
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Recall that I estimate the hub premium as the fare premium that hub carriers receive relative to non-hub carriers on a given route. The estimates in the first column of the table indicate that, during the pre-partnership period, airlines' flights that departed from airports at which they have between 40% and 58% of departing flights (Hubsize1) received 7% higher fares. Their flights that departed from airports at which they had more than 58% of departing flights (Hubsize2) received 18% higher fares. These fare premiums are relative to the fares received by carriers for whom neither endpoint of the route is a hub of any size. The coefficient on the Arrives Hubsize2 variable indicates that airlines' flights that arrive at their large hubs also enjoy a fare premium (about 5.6%), but this premium is considerably smaller than the premium on flights that depart from airports at which they are dominant. A comparison of the coefficients on Hubsize2 and Arrives Hubsize2 suggests that, all else equal, flights that depart from an airline's large hubs receive fares that are about 12.5% higher than flights that arrive at an airline's large hubs.
[ Table 4 about here]
In the second column of the table, I exclude the variables measuring whether a flight arrives at an airline's hub so that I can estimate the hub effect as the fare premium that a carrier with a hub at the origin airport of a route receives relative to all other carriers serving that route (even carriers who have a hub at the destination airport). The results from this specification imply a premium of about 4% on routes that depart from an airline's small hubs and a premium of about 14% on routes that depart from an airline's large hubs. As expected, the estimates of the hub premium fall once routes that arrive at an airline's hubs are included in the "control group".
Finally, in the third column of Table 4 , I add connecting flights to the sample. By including connecting service, I have a larger number of carriers (and itineraries) for each route.
This allows me to more easily estimate both the route-quarter fixed effects and the hub effects.
Once connecting flights are included, I add a dummy variable that controls for whether a flight is direct. The inclusion of connecting flights increases the estimates on the hub variables significantly. Flights departing from airlines' small hubs now enjoy a premium of 9.5% while flights departing from airlines' large hubs enjoy a premium of 26%. There are two likely reasons why the estimates increase. First, in this sample, the hub variables are identified off of both the direct and the connecting flights of hub airlines. However, an airline's connecting flights out of its own hubs is a somewhat strange set of flights to look at since airlines usually serve almost all routes directly out of their own hubs. Thus, the set of passengers flying a connecting itinerary on a hub carrier may have specific unobservable characteristics that are positively correlated with fares (for example, they may be flying a connecting itinerary instead of a direct one because they booked last minute and all direct flights were sold out). Indeed, the average number of passengers flying direct itineraries on hub carriers is about 60 times the average number of passengers flying connecting itineraries on hub carriers. Second, in this sample, flights operated by non-hub carriers are now largely connecting service. To the extent that the dummy variable indicating direct service does not perfectly control for quality differences between direct and connecting flights, some of this may be captured by the hub variables.
It is useful to briefly compare the estimates of the "hub premium" that I obtain to those measured elsewhere in the literature. Lee and Prado (2005) is perhaps the most natural reference point since they too include market fixed effects and measure airport dominance using two dummy variables. However, because they do not distinguish between direct and connecting itineraries and because they do not define markets as directional, our results will not be identical.
In specifications that include market fixed effects but do not exploit their fare class data (and so are roughly comparable to mine), they estimate a hub premium of 16.9% for flights that involve an airline's large hubs. This estimate falls well within the range of estimates that I obtain.
The Effect of Extending a Dominant Carrier's FFP
I now turn to the analysis that investigates what happens when a dominant airline's FFP
is extended to include its partner's flights. Tables 5 estimates these effects using the first set of "control routes" -an airline's own flights that depart from airports at which neither it nor its partner is dominant. Column one estimates the impact of the partnerships on an airline's mean fare received. The insignificant coefficient on Partner Hubsize1*Partnership Period indicates that inclusion in its partner's FFP had no effect on an airline's fares on routes that departed from airports at which its partner has between 40% and 58% of flights. On the other hand, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on Partner Hubsize2*Partnership Period indicates thatonce the its partner's FFP points could be earned its flights -the mean fare that an airline received on flights departing from airports at which its partner operated more than 58% of flights increased. The point estimate implies a fare increase of about 3.8%. At the average one-way mean fare on routes that depart from airports at which an airline has less than 40% of departing flights ($201), this is approximately equivalent to an $8 one-way fare increase. Recall that this change in fares is over and above any change in fares that the airline experiences on all of its direct flights in a given quarter (captured by the airline-quarter fixed effects). The positive coefficient on Partner Hubsize2*Partnership Period provides the first piece of evidence of a positive relationship between fares and offering the FFP points of the dominant carrier at an airport. In addition, the fact that there is no estimated effect of the partnerships on an airline's flights that depart from airports at which its partner is only moderately dominant (Partner
Hubsize1)
suggests that what I am measuring is, in fact, a "FPP effect" and not, for example, the result of some of other change in demand, cost or competition resulting from the partnerships.
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Assuming that an airline's level of dominance at an airport is a good proxy for the extent to which consumers at the airport value its FFP points, then it is precisely at those airports at which an airline is most dominant that consumers will most value the ability to earn that airline's FFP points on another airline's flights.
[ Table 5 about here]
With respect to the impact of the partnerships on an airline's fares on routes that depart from airports at which it itself is dominant, the estimates in column one indicate that there is no effect on an airline's fares on routes that depart from its small hubs and there is a small effect (about 1.8%) on an airline's fares on routes that depart from its large hubs. This suggests that consumers may have viewed the FFP partnerships to be enhancements to the airlines' FFPs; however, this coefficient could also be capturing the fact that, over this period, these airlines are also increasingly entering in FFP partnerships with international carriers and this could be increasing hub fares as well.
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In the second and third columns of Table 5 , I investigate how the partnerships affect the 20 th and 80 th percentile fare paid for a flight. If FFPs are most highly valued by business travelers and if fares towards the top of the distribution represent tickets more likely to have been purchased by business travelers, then one would expect the impact of being able to earn the hub carrier's FFP points to be larger at the top of the distribution. The estimates in Table 5 suggest that this was the case. The partnerships had no effect on an airline's 20 th percentile fare on flights that depart from its partner's most dominated airports while an airline's 80 th percentile fare on these routes increased by more than 7%. At the average 80 th percentile fare on flights that do not depart from an airline's own dominated airports ($274), this represents an increase of about $19 per one-way travel or $38 per roundtrip. This is indeed a substantial increase in airlines' realized fares on these routes.
Interestingly, the pattern is somewhat different for an airline's flights that depart from its own hubs. The partnerships increase an airline's 80 th but not its 20 th percentile fare on routes that depart from airports in Hubsize1, and increase an airline's 20 th but not its 80 th percentile fare on routes that depart from airports in Hubsize2. This pattern is a little puzzling but could be capturing the fact that the enhancement effects of these partnerships are not straightforward.
Consumers will perceive these partnerships to be enhancements to an airline's FFPs if they increase the set of available earning and redemption opportunities. If so, then this enhancement effect might, in fact, be largest not at an airline's most dominated airports, but rather at airports where the airline is dominant enough that consumers are invested in its FFP but not so dominant the addition of its partner has no actual impact on consumers' available earning and redemption opportunities.
In the fourth column of Table 5 , I estimate the impact of the partnerships on an airline's connecting flights. As mentioned earlier, to the extent that consumers' valuation of direct service is positively correlated with their valuation of FFP points (as one might expect for business travelers), then it is an airline's direct flights out of its partner's hubs that should be most affected by the FFP partnerships. Nonetheless it is worthwhile to briefly investigate the impact on connecting flights. The estimates indicate that an airline's mean fare on connecting flights that depart from its partner's large hubs increased by about 1.7%. This change in fares is over and above any change in fares that the airline experiences on all of its connecting flights in a given quarter (captured by the airline-quarter fixed effects which are now identified by an airline's connecting rather than direct flights). Thus, the point estimates imply that relative to their respective sets of "control routes", an airline's direct flights departing from its partner's hubs experience a larger change in fares than its connecting flights. This is exactly what one would expect.
Interestingly, the pattern is reversed for an airline's connecting flights departing from its own hubs. Relative to their respective control groups, an airline's connecting flights departing from its own hubs experience a larger fare increase than its direct flights departing from its own hubs. While this may seem surprising, recall that the coefficients on the Hubsize interactions must interpreted with caution since their may be other factors affecting an airline's fares out of its own hubs. Furthermore, as mentioned above, an airline's connecting flights out of its own hubs is a somewhat strange set of flights to look at since airlines usually serve almost all routes directly out of their own hubs. Thus, one might expect the set of passengers flying a connecting itinerary on a hub carrier may have specific unobservable characteristics that are correlated with fares.
It is worth briefly commenting on the negative coefficient on the Frequency variable in Table 5 . In general, one expects that higher frequency of service is associated with higher fares.
However, when airline-route fixed effects are included, Frequency is only identified off of changes over time in an airline's frequency on a given route and these changes may be correlated with other factors that have a negative impact on fares.
In Table 6 , I replace the airline-quarter fixed effects with origin-quarter fixed effects.
Intuitively, this changes the set of "control routes" from an airline's own flights out of other airports to other airlines' flights out of the same airport. For example, if the "treatment" routes are Delta's flights out of its partner United's hubs, the control routes used in Table 5 are Delta's flights out of airports at which neither it nor United is dominant while the control routes used in Table 6 are American's, Continental's, Northwest's and US Airways' flights out of airports at which United is dominant. This set of control routes is preferred if one is concerned that the estimates on the Partner Hubsize variables are capturing changes in airport-level unobservables that may be correlated with the formation of the partnerships rather than changes in airlinespecific unobservables that may be correlated with the formation of the partnerships. The results using this set of control routes are extremely consistent with those in Table 5 . The first column of Table 6 estimates the model using an airline's mean fare as the dependent variable. The results indicate a slightly less than 5% increase in fares on airlines' routes that depart from airports at which their partner has more than 58% of departing flights. Consistent with Table 5 , columns two and three of the table show no effect of the partnerships on airlines' 20 th percentile fares on routes departing from their partners' dominated airports and a large impact (about 9%) on airlines' 80 th percentile fares.
[ Table 6 about here]
The estimates from Table 4 through 6 can now be used to calculate approximately what fraction of the "hub premium "is due to the fact that the hub carrier offers the most attractive FFP. The results from the second column of Table 4 indicate that, on average, hub carriers receive fares that are 14% higher than other carriers serving the same route (including carriers for whom the arrival airport of the route is a hub). 29 How much of this fare premium is due to the fact that consumers perceive the hub carrier to offer the most valuable FFP at the airport? The estimates from the first columns of Table 5 and 6 imply that once consumers are allowed to earn the hub carrier's FFP points on flights on which they previously could not these points, the mean fare received on these flights increased by between 3.5% and 5%. Thus, simply offering consumers the FFP points of the dominant carrier at an airport leads to a price premium of between 3.5% and 5%. Combining this with the estimates of the hub premium implies that FFPs account for at least 25% to 36% of the fare premium that hub carriers receive. Using the analogous estimates for the 80 th percentile fare (in the second columns of Tables 5 and 6 and the estimates in the second column of the t able in Appendix B), I calculate the FFPs account for between 29% and 37% of the fare premium that hub carriers receive.
Robustness
In Table 7 , I carry out several checks on the robustness of the results. I use the specification that appears in the third column of Table 5 . The results are similar when I use replace the airline-quarter fixed effects with origin-quarter fixed effects.
[ Table 7 about here]
First, I re-estimate the model excluding Continental and Northwest. Because the Continental-Northwest partnership also involved codesharing, this partnership could lead to changes in fares for reasons other than the FFP mechanism described above, in particular on routes on which they both provide direct service (such as routes between their respective hubs). 30 Since these are also the types of routes that identify the coefficients on the Partner Hubsize interaction terms, it is important to confirm that these coefficients are not simply capturing the effects of their codesharing. In addition, Continental and Northwest's codesharing arrangement could cause them to change scheduling or other unobserved characteristics of their flights in ways that could affect fares. The first column of Table 7 shows that the coefficient on Partner Hubsize2*Partnership Period is very similar when Continental and Northwest are excluded.
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Second, I investigate whether the price increases that I find may be capturing a reduction in the intensity of price competition. Almost all of the routes that an airline serves out of its partner's hubs are routes that the partner will serve as well. Therefore, could the observed increase in fares be the result of the partners competing less intensely with each other? To test this, I exploit the fact that there are routes on which an airline and its partner both offer direct service but which do not depart from the airline's partner's dominated airports. I construct the variable Both Serve which is a dummy variable that equals one for routes on which the airline and its partner both provide direct service and interact this variable with the dummy variable Partnership Period. To avoid endogenous changes in whether or not both partners serve a particular route, I drop the small number of airline-routes on which there is either entry or exit by the airline's partner anytime during the sample (this drops 68 routes or about 1200 observations).
Since this eliminate any variation in Both Serve within a given airline-route, the coefficient on The results in the second column of Table 7 indicate that this appears to be the case. After the partnerships are in place, airlines receive slightly higher fares on routes on which they overlap with their partners but still higher fares on routes that depart from their partner's most dominated airports.
In the third column of Table 7 , I take this exercise one step further and explore the positive coefficient on Both Serve*Partnership Period in a slightly more detailed way. There are effectively three "types" of routes that may be served by both an airline and its partner.
These are (1) routes that depart from the airline's own hubs (and likely arrive at the partner's hubs); (2) routes that depart from the partner's hubs (and likely arrive at the airline's hubs); and (3) routes that depart from neither of their hubs. While Partner Hubsize2 effectively "selects" out the second set of routes, the first and third sets are both captured by Both Serve*Partnership Period. To investigate whether these two types of overlap routes are differentially affected by the partnerships, I interact the Hubsize interactions with the Both Serve dummy. This tests whether fares on an airline's routes that depart from its own dominated airports and that are also served by its partner are affected differently than fares on routes that depart from the airline's hubs that are not served by the partner. The results of this exercise indicates that an airline's flights on routes that depart from its own dominated airports that are also served by its partner experience 6% higher fares after the partnerships. There is no change in the airline's fares on other overlap routes, as implied by the now insignificant coefficient on Both Serve*Partnership
Period.
This finding might, initially, seem surprising. One might expect that an airline's routes out of its own hubs on which it competes directly with its partner would be the least likely to experience fare increases since it is precisely these routes on which the partner's flights have now become closer substitutes. While this reasoning is correct, this effect may be offset by two others working in the opposite direction. First, on routes on which both partners provide direct service, the "effective" frequency of flights on which the dominant airline's FFP points can be earned has increased. If consumers value the frequency of flights on which a particular airline's FFP points can be earned, then the fact that the dominant airline's points can be earned on both its own and its partner's flights on a route might have a positive impact on demand. Second, an airline's routes that depart from its own hub and that are also served by its partner are the "return flights" of routes that depart from the airline's partner's hubs. For example, Delta's flights from Atlanta (a Delta hub) to Chicago O'Hare (a United hub) -a route on which both Delta and United provide direct service -are the return flights of Delta's flights from Chicago O'Hare to Atlanta. Since the partnerships increase Delta's sales of high fare tickets to passengers traveling O'Hare to Atlanta, this may reduce the number of lower fare tickets that Delta sells from Atlanta to O'Hare, relative to the pre-partnership period when its O'Hare-Atlanta flights were less attractive to consumers in Chicago. The fact there is no impact at all on an airline's fares on routes on which it competes with its partner that do not depart from either's hubs suggests that results are indeed detecting a "FFP effect" and not just capturing reduced competition between the partners.
In the final column of Table 7 , I take the analysis one step further and directly investigate the impact of the partnerships on flight frequency. For this exercise, I take the data up to the airline-city pair (as opposed to airline-route) level since frequency (unlike fares) is generally the same in both directions of a city pair. That is, an airline will typically have the same frequency of flights between Boston and Atlanta as it does between Atlanta and Boston. 32 In contrast, depending on the composition of tickets sold, realized fares may be quite different in the two directions of a city pair. The airline-route fixed effects are replaced with airline-city pair fixed effects. As before, airline-quarter fixed effects are included. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of flights per week that the airline operates on the city pair (Frequency).
I investigate whether airlines are changing their frequencies on city pairs that have their partner's hubs on one of the endpoints (i.e.: the city pairs on which the partnerships have been shown to affect fares). To do this, I re-define the Partner Hubsize variables to include either endpoint of the city pair. For example, Partner Hubsize2 now equals one if either endpoint of the city pair is an airport at which the airline's partner has greater than 58% of departing flights.
The estimates from this specification suggest that airlines are decreasing their frequency on city pairs that involve their partner's small hubs (captured by the Partner Hubsize1 interaction) but increasing their frequency on city pairs that involve their partner's large hubs (captured by the Partner Hubsize2 interaction). Recall that it is on routes that depart from their partners large hubs that the majority of the price effects were detected. The finding of an increase in frequency on these particular city pairs provides additional evidence that the pricing effects found in the previous tables are not simply measuring a reduction in competition between the carriers.
Conclusion
This paper has estimated the relationship between FFPs and the fare premiums that hub carriers receive. To separate the effects of FFPs from the other advantages that may increase dominant airlines' fares, the paper developed a novel empirical approach that exploits variation resulting from the formation of three FFP partnerships. These partnerships are helpful for isolating the effects of FFPs because they effectively extend an airline's FFP to include a new set of flights -those operated by the airline's partner -which were not previously included in the program. If FFPs are one of the reasons why airlines receives higher fares on routes that depart from airports at which they are dominant, then these FFP partnerships should allow airlines' partners to also charge higher fares on routes that depart from these exact airports.
The results indicate that this was indeed the case. After the formation of their FFP partnerships, airlines' received higher fares on routes that departed from specifically those airports at which their partner was dominant. Consistent with a "FFP story", the effects were most pronounced at the top of the fare distribution. The estimates imply that allowing consumers to earn the hub carrier's FFP points on a flight increased the mean fare received by between 3.5% and 5% and the 80 th percentile fare that received by between 7% and 9%. Taking these as a lower bound estimate of the impact that FFPs have on fares, they suggest that a dominant airline's FFP increases its one-way mean fare by at least $7-$10 and its one-way 80 th percentile fare by at least $19-$25. Combining these figures with estimates that indicate that hub carriers receive mean fares that are about 14% higher than other carriers serving the same route suggests that FFPs may account for over 25% of the fare premium that hub carriers receive.
Since the emergence of hub-and-spoke systems, the relationship between airport-level dominance and route-level market power has attracted considerable attention. While there have been a number of studies documenting the existence and robustness of the "hub premium", there has been limited research into the causes of the "hub premium". However, understanding the various factors that may provide dominant airlines with an advantage is critical to designing any policy intervention that seeks to increase competition at hubs. Because of the welfare benefits that hub-and-spoke networks provide, an outright ban on hubs has never appeared a plausible or desirable response. Rather, targeting the specific sources of advantage (for example, FFPs or control over scarce airport facilities) appears a more fruitful approach. While I interpret the results of this paper somewhat cautiously since they are based on the "experiment" provided by FFP partnerships, they suggest that, all else equal, imposing restrictions on airlines' use of FFPs would indeed lower the fare premium that dominant airlines command.
Appendix A -Construction of Dataset
Databank 1A is a random 10% sample of all domestic tickets that originate in the U.S. on domestic carriers each quarter. Each observation in the databank contains information on the route traveled (the origin, destination and any connecting airports), the carrier(s), the type of ticket (one-way, round-trip or open-jaw), the class of service (coach, business or first), the dollar fare, and the distance of the trip. Importantly, the data also contain a variable indicating the origin of the ticket, which allows the direction of travel on roundtrip tickets to be distinguished Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The first column excludes Continental and Northwest. Frequency is included in columns one through three but its coefficient is not reported. Columns two and three exclude airline-routes where there is entry or exit during the sample by the airline's partner Column four uses data at the airlinecity pair level.
1 See, for example, Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992) and Brueckner and Spiller (1994) . As well, see Borenstein and Rose (2005) for a discussion of both the benefits of hub-and-spoke networks and limitations to these benefits.
2 See Borenstein (1989) and (1991), Evans and Kessides (1993) , Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (1997) , Lee and Prado (2005) , Ciliberto and Williams (2007) , and various U.S. General
Accounting Office studies.
3 This is particularly true given that any policy intervention would need to balance any welfare losses due to reduced competition at hubs against the welfare benefits that result from hub-andspoke systems. 6 It is important to emphasize that the "experiment" provided by the partnerships allow me to investigate whether FFPs are one of the reasons why dominant carriers receive higher fares than their competitors on a route (or at an airport). The partnerships do not allow me to investigate whether FFPs discourage entry into hub airports and thereby affect fares on routes departing from these airports. 7 Related papers that investigate the relationship between airport dominance and demand include Borenstein (1991) , Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006) and Lederman (2006) . Morrison and Winston (1995) and Morrison and Winston (2000) analyze a cross-section of airports and relate airport concentration to average fares. 8 Other papers which use structural models to estimate markups (but which do not focus on hubs)
include Reiss and Spiller (1989) , Berry (1990) , and Aguirregabiria and Ho (2006) . 9 Gordon and Jenkins (2000) also make use of disaggregated fare class data. Using data that only includes Northwest Airlines, they find that there is no hub premium and, in fact, passengers flying on routes that originate or terminate at a Northwest hub pay slightly less than passengers flying through Northwest hubs. There are, however, a number of problems with the methodology used in their study. For example, passengers connecting from one of Northwest's regional partners are treated as hub originating passengers. 10 The first FFP was introduced by American Airlines in May of 1981, three years after the deregulation of the airline industry. For more on the history of FFPs, see http://www.frequentflier.com/ffp-005.htm and Mason and Barker (1996) .
11 For example, in many FFPs, 25,000 points are required for an economy class reward flight within the U.S., 40,000 points are required for a business class reward flight within the U.S., and 50,000 points are required for an economy class reward flight between the U.S. and Europe.
Assuming that the price of a business class domestic flight is more than 1.6 times the price of an economy class domestic flight and the price of an economy class flight to Europe is more than twice the price of an economy class flight with in the U.S., then the value of rewards increases non-linearly with the number of points required. These assumptions may not necessarily be true for all possible ticket prices, but on average these relationships should hold.
23 I use 58% instead of 60% as the cutoff for the second category because there are several airports at which an airline has just below 60% of flights in some quarters and I want these to be counted in the highest category. 24 There are several reasons for using dummy variables to measure airport dominance. First, I
expect that the relationship between an airline's level of dominance at an airport and fares to be nonlinear. For example, increases in an airline's share of flights should have a very small impact on fares when an airline has a very small or very large share of flights but a larger impact when an airline is on the verge of becoming dominant. Second, dummy variables are appropriate because the data on airport shares are fairly clustered. More specifically, airlines will generally have a very large share of flights at their own hubs, a very small share of flights at their competitors' hubs and, in a small number of cases, a moderate share of flights at either a small hub or an airport (like Boston) that is not a hub to any carrier. Finally, the use of dummy variables to measure airport dominance helps simplify the interpretation of the coefficients on the key variables which are an interaction between an airline's partner's level of dominance and an indicator for whether the airline's FFP partnership is in place. 25 Unobservables which do not differentially affect prices on an airline's routes out its partner's hubs but rather affect prices on all routes by a particular airline or out of a particular airport will be captured by one of the two sets of time-varying fixed effects. Entry by low-cost carriers would be an example of this type of unobservable. increase an airline's fares on all routes that arrive at its hubs. This has no impact on the coefficient on Partner Hubsize2 interactions.
28 See Lederman (2006) . 29 I use the estimates in the second column of Table 4 for this exercise because they represent the average fare premium that a hub carrier receives relative to all other carriers serving the route.
30 See Ito and Lee (2006) and (2007) and Armantier and Richard (2005) and (2006) 32 In the small number of cases where an airline had different frequency in the two directions of a city pair, I randomly chose which frequency to assign to the city pair. The results are quite similar when the regressions in Table 7 are carried out at the route, rather than city pair, level.
